‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’: thinking through post-structuralism and cognitivism by Geal, Robert
1 
 
‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’: 
Thinking through post-structuralism and cognitivism  
 
Robert Geal 






This essay explores the historical socio-cultural contexts that determine the contending 
epistemologies of post-structuralism and cognitivism. Debates between these paradigms have 
focused on a-priori philosophical premises. Synthesis between these premises has not 
materialised because each paradigm valorises a form of knowledge which its rival cannot match. 
This essay attempts to position these contested premises within a diachronic background in 
which theoretical claims can be tested, not merely against fixed deductive positions, but against 
specific socio-cultural contexts that manifest themselves in epistemology. Post-structuralism and 
cognitivism can then be thought of as aggregates of thought reflecting broad political, social, 













To say that film studies‟ methodological protocols are highly contested would be an 
understatement. Reasons given for the lack of consensus range from John Mullarkey‟s assertion 
that „[a]s a consequence of its infancy no doubt, film-philosophy has been unable to avoid being 
highly partisan thus far: [...] film being understood entirely through one paradigm, cognitive 
science, cultural studies, Freudian psychodynamics, rhizomatic materialism, and so on‟ (2009, 
6), to Casey Haskin‟s contextualisation of film theory‟s contested „meta-orthodoxy [as] hardly 
unique to film theory. Its bipolar pattern is a staple of endless histories of intellectual conflict, in 
philosophy, religion, and elsewhere‟ (2009, 36). These divisions are most starkly delineated 
between both the a-priori philosophical foundations, and the interpretative conclusions derived 
therefrom, within two of the discipline‟s leading paradigms, post-structuralism and cognitivism. 
Given the veracity with which cognitivism challenged what it saw as post-structuralism‟s 
„orthodoxy‟, there have been numerous studies which have attempted to account for rivalous 
epistemological claims, proselytise converts, negotiate synthesis  and advocate further theoretical 
alternatives. This essay will trace the impact of some of those studies presently, but it will also 
attempt to position those studies within a diachronic background in which theoretical claims can 
be tested, not merely against fixed deductive positions, but against specific socio-cultural 
contexts which manifest themselves in epistemology. Post-structuralism and cognitivism can 
then be thought of as aggregates of thought reflecting broad political, social, philosophical and 
cultural contexts. 
In elucidating the relationships between these contexts and the theoretical protocols they 
inspire, this historical approach can clarify the impact of ideology, which is the concept at the 
heart of the conflict between Haskin‟s bipolar paradigms. For political scientist Robert W. Cox 
„[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. 
Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and 
space‟ (1996, 87, original emphasis). Debates between post-structuralism and cognitivism have 
frequently foregrounded their differences within an ideological context, but they have not 
adequately addressed Cox‟s contention that their „[p]erspectives derive from a position in time 
and space, specifically social and political time and space‟ (87). Analysing the relationships 
between these perspectives and their concomitant „social and political time and space‟ can help 
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clarify the way in which their approaches to ideology operate „for someone and for some 
purpose‟ (87). 
 
The incommensurability of post-structuralism and cognitivism 
The historical development of the intellectual conflict between post-structuralism and 
cognitivism is the natural starting point for this analysis, not only because it clarifies areas of 
disagreement, but also because it demonstrates that this delineation of thought is both ideological 
and historically contingent. There are three primary areas of contention between these 
paradigms, the first of which is somewhat unintentional, so that part of the problem that the 
discipline has had in terms of clarifying and negotiating different positions has been down to the 
way that rivals have grouped together and classified studies according to criteria which their 
original authors do not necessarily accept. The notion of “Theory” or “Grand Theory”, as 
critiqued by cognitivism, is particularly prone to such generalisations. Research which might 
more accurately be labelled structuralism, auteur-structuralism, post-structuralism, 
psychoanalytic theory or apparatus theory have frequently been grouped together under such 
generalising rubrics as SLAB (Saussure, Lacan, Althusser, Barthes) theory (Bordwell 1989a), 
subject-position theory (Bordwell 1996), Grand Theory (Bordwell and Carroll 1996) and, with a 
capital “T”, Theory (Bordwell and Carroll 1996). Cognitivism itself has been conceived more 
systematically, defining itself as a rejection of “Theory‟s” totalising tendencies (Bordwell 1989b, 
261). It proposes, instead, explanations focusing on rationality rather than suppressed pleasure 
principles (Carroll 1996, 65), and the application of piecemeal theorising (Carroll 1996, 58). 
This generalisation about rivals has not helped the discipline to negotiate its present 
situation, and it characterises critiques of rival epistemologies, particularly in regards to the 
second area of contention; underlying a-priori philosophical premises. Rejecting what Malcom 
Turvey refers to as the „“fashionable nonsense” and dogma of psychoanalytical-semiotic film 
theory‟ (2007, 116), the cognitivist „regards the spectator to be a unified, rational agent at the 
outset, an agent who consciously, and actively, processes the stimuli manifest on the movie 
screen‟ (Buckland 1989, 82, original emphasis). For the post-structuralist, this development is 
not only philosophically unsound, since „cognitivists are attempting to position film studies 
somewhere between language and its objects, and in doing so they are forced to rely upon a set 
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of anti-holistic philosophical views‟ (Vescio 2001, 580), but also, since it „presents itself as 
objective, rather than acknowledging itself to be relatively autonomous, it is open to the charge 
of scientific imperialism, for its own norms and values are presented as the absolute standard 
against which to interpret the norms and values of other paradigms‟ (Buckland 1989, 81). 
This scientific imperialism not only inhibits debate between paradigms, as cognitivism 
valorises a form of knowledge which its rival cannot match, and indeed has no interest in 
matching, but it also leads into a third area of contention; the issue of ideology. Because of both 
its attempted objective methodology and its rejection of post-structuralism‟s „“fashionable 
nonsense” and dogma of psychoanalytical-semiotic film theory‟ (Turvey 2007, 116) cognitivism 
has problematized the notion of ideology‟s impact. The influence and centrality of ideology to 
the difference between these paradigms is demonstrated in their understandings of the 
relationships between the academic and the studies (s)he undertakes. These deductive differences 
are demonstrated by David Bordwell‟s personal website‟s response to Slavoj Žižek‟s accusation 
that cognitivism fails to account for ideology because it does not address the author‟s own act of 
enunciation (Žižek 2001, 15-6): „Žižek uses enunciation theory for the basis of his objection. If 
you don‟t accept a theory of enunciation […] the objection fails‟ (Bordwell 2005). Bordwell 
does not accept that his studies contain the inevitable bias of any partial observer because, as 
Warren Buckland argues, cognitivism‟s „scientific discourse sees itself fit to criticise 
systematically the unscientific basis of other discourses without justifying its own premises. It 
regards itself as the only legitimate discourse because it is based on the “intrinsic” laws of 
reasoning‟ (1989, 87). This difference in conceptualising the ideological role of the academic 
demonstrates the tight bundling of epistemological and ideological differences between 
paradigms, and the ways in which cognitivism‟s approach to meaning-making refutes that which 
post-structuralism understands as inherently ideological. Bordwell rejects both the substance and 
the logic of Žižek‟s argument, and can deny but not debate the relationship between academic 
enunciation and ideology. 
These different conceptions of the academic subject go so far as to characterise the ways 
that the paradigms understand their locations within the discipline. The post-structuralist position 
acknowledges the impact of academic enunciation on intellectual discourse, with these divisions 




a whole set of dilemmas, from the purely epistemological to politico-ideological 
ones: [...] the antagonism between Theory and Post-Theory is a particular case of 
the global battle for intellectual hegemony and visibility between exponents of post-
modern/deconstructionist cultural studies and [...] cognitivists and popularisers of 
hard sciences. (Žižek 2001, 2) 
 
He links these antagonisms to a series of intellectual scandals, such as the de Man and Sokal 
affairs, with antecedents going back through Freud, Darwin and German Idealism down to 
Socrates (2-5). Bordwell, conversely, downplays or even disavows the influence of cognitivism 
upon intellectual trends, asking „[w]hy do Žižek and MacCabe
1
 elevate a single anthology (Post-
Theory)
2
 into a movement (Post-Theory)? The book has won little attention, and no one else has 
built it into a mighty opposite to Lacanian theory‟ (2005). Film philosopher Mullarkey, a 
relatively impartial observer in the debate, remarks that „[w]ithout a doubt, the research 
paradigm of Bordwell and his associates [...] has been extremely influential [...] in the decline of 
“Grand Theory”. [...] Indeed, with the increasingly empirical bent of the post-Bordwellian era, it 
is arguable that film theory has been transformed back into the film studies from which it 
emerged‟ (2009, 31-2, original emphasis). As such, competing claims as to the importance of 
intellectual activity in influencing cultural discourse reflect deductive epistemological premises. 
That is not to say that attempts have not been made to synthesise these paradigms, or to at 
least build methodologies for studies that might be improved by mixing together elements of 
both. The broad failures of these studies, at least in the respect of their influence on the 
discipline‟s negotiations between the paradigms, if not on the specific subjects to which they 
have been applied, demonstrates one principle area of consistency; an attempt to incorporate 
cognitivism‟s scientific objectivity into post-structuralism‟s elaboration of ideology. In the wake 
of cognitivism‟s offensive, this was post-structuralism‟s attempted compromise; as Richard 
Lapsley and Michael Westlake argue, paraphrasing Lacan, „although there is no metalanguage, 
we cannot but search for one‟ (2006, xvi), so that questions about ideology, and attempts to 
understand its operations theoretically, have always remained pertinent.
3
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the 1990s, from both paradigms, calls for refinement, engagement and debate to transcend the 
accusations that each side fails to engage with the other‟s criticisms. 
From the psychoanalytic perspective, for example, Judith Mayne argued that „[t]he study 
of spectatorship in film theory has always involved some complicated negotiations of “subjects” 
and “viewers,” despite claims that the two are incompatible terms‟ (1993, 9), and Jackie Stacey 
attempted to construct a  
 
dialectical relationship [...] between the material studied and the theory which is 
used to analyse it. Female spectators‟ accounts of the cinema are used to criticise or 
confirm existing film theory, and indeed produce new or refined categories which 
could usefully add to our understanding of how audiences watch films. (Stacey 
1994, 72) 
 
From the cognitivist position, Stephen Prince similarly saw potential synthesis in an empirical 
dimension to the construction of theory: „Research on real viewers will need to be placed within 
a theoretical framework, but any theory of spectatorship which fails to deal at some level with 
the empirical evidence on spectatorship should be suspected of being insufficiently grounded‟ 
(1996, 72). 
This emphasis on potential synthesis led Torben Grodal, in a conference paper delivered in 
the last month of the decade, to argue that cognitivist criticisms, when tempered, might provide 
the grounds to rectify theoretical deficiencies: 
 
The problem with Bordwell‟s argument is that he confuses a critique of bad theories 
and bad applications of deductive reasoning and unconvincing exemplifications, 
with a critique of a theory-driven procedure as such. From my point of view grand 
theories are necessary, not only in themselves, but also as guide-lines for middle-
level research. [...] A wrong grand theory provides a massive series of false insights 
in a series of levels and fields. The antidote for this danger is however not to shun 
grand theories, but to replace bad grand theories with better ones. (Grodal in 




As already mentioned, however, cognitivism did not challenge post-structuralism only on the 
grounds of the lack of evidence for its claims. Implicit in such a critique was a rejection of post-
structuralism‟s subjective relation to its studies, and the recognition of ideology inherent in that 
relationship. It is therefore not only a stubborn refusal to engage with the other‟s criticisms 
which prevents progress, but the fact that potentially incommensurate epistemologies prevent 
meaningful dialogue. Each paradigm can only answer the other through an internal logic which 
carries no legitimate weight for the rival paradigm. For Mullarkey, the fact that „Bordwell is 
coming from a position that sees itself as so different from Žižek that even where a dialogue of 
sorts might begin, it amounts to nothing‟ leads him to ask, „[i]s this a question, therefore, of 
different, incommensurate axioms, [...] adversaries using language rules from one “phrase 
regimen” and applying them to another?‟ (2009, 60, original emphasis). Thus, Bordwell argues 
that Žižek‟s critique of his own earlier work „instantiates all the conceptual commitments and 
rhetorical habits I criticize‟ (2005) and that it is „more than a little surprising to find that at nearly 
every opportunity Žižek doesn‟t engage with the substantive arguments of Post-Theory at all‟ 
(2005). 
 
Epistemology as historical construct 
If synthesis or even compromise is so problematic, then it is important to establish the ways in 
which scholars are persuaded to pledge themselves to one cause or the other. Each paradigm 
wields a self-contained logic that the other cannot penetrate, and each is therefore, ostensibly, as 
persuasive as the other. The way in which the paradigms mischaracterise one another is an 
important element of this. In the wake of cognitivism‟s first wave, Buckland was confident 
enough, in critiquing its misguided interpretation of post-structuralism „as a scientific discourse‟, 
which leads cognitivism to „condemn [post-structuralism] for not strictly adhering to scientific 
standards‟ (1989, 81), to claim that „we must be wary of the non-believer's representation of the 
fundamental concepts that constitute that theory, for no matter how urgent the demystification an 
established theory may command, misrepresentation will simply leave that theory intact‟ (103). 
The subsequent development of film studies did not develop in this way, however, and for 
Haskins at least, „[i]t bespeaks at least incremental progress in film theory since cognitivist 
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critiques began to appear that most scholars in the field generally agree that [film studies‟] lack 
of a grand unifying theory or method is a good thing‟ (2009, 33). Cognitivism‟s 
„misrepresentation‟ of post-structuralism did not „leave that theory intact‟ (Buckland 1989, 103). 
It is this element of the unfolding nature of film studies that perhaps offers insight into 
the ways in which different epistemologies persuade and develop. Carroll understands the impact 
of his work in starkly rigid terms: „I have little or no expectation about changing the hearts and 
minds of advocates of the Theory. There are sound sociological reasons for believing that 
scholars who are already deeply invested in a paradigm are unlikely to surrender it. Careers, 
tenures, promotions, publications, and reputations have been and continue to be built by 
espousing the Theory‟ (1996, 68). He does not expect to convert his rivals, in fact he has his 
mind set on a different target for proselytization, although his disavowal of his intentions in this 
regard borders on the passive aggressive: „And, in any case, most academics remain locked in 
the paradigm they learned in graduate school‟ (68). However, if it is reasonable to accept that the 
academic will not become an apostate, it is also reasonable to accept that the graduate student, or 
anyone else not yet pledged to one paradigm or the other, is not necessarily a tabula rasa. And, if 
the post-structuralist was moulded by overdetermined socio-cultural contexts that culminated in 
the student protests in Paris in 1968, as so many film theory introductions and readers claim, and 
if advocacy of one or another paradigm cannot be explained by one or the other having „won‟ the 
objective intellectual argument, then an analysis of diachronic socio-cultural developments might 
help explain academics‟ subsequent epistemological allegiances. 
The failed attempts of both paradigms to critique one another, within an environment in 
which both have an internal logic impervious to its rival‟s arguments, can thereby be placed 
within an historical, socially- and culturally-informed context. Academics can then be 
understood as being persuaded, not by the efficacy of one or other mutually exclusive form of 
argumentation in and of itself, but by the existence of those mutually exclusive forms of 
argumentations within complex and developing socio-cultural contexts. 
I have already mentioned the conventionalised link drawn between Paris ‟68 and post-
structuralism, but I want to expand upon that before making some comments about the socio-
cultural background that might inform cognitivism. An appropriate academic framework to apply 
here can be found in historical sociology. Duncan Kelly explains that „historical sociology tries 
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to make explicit the relationship between social theory and historical change; that is, historical 
sociology uses social theory in a self-conscious way to outline general propositions about the 
nature of historical development‟ (2003, 11). For John Hobson it is „a critical approach which 
refuses to treat the present as an autonomous entity outside of history‟ (2002, 13). The extent to 
which film studies‟ rival epistemologies „treat the present as an autonomous entity outside of 
history‟ (13) is perhaps open to debate; they certainly analyse film texts in a historicised context. 
Yet if they do not quite employ what Hobson calls „chronofetishism, the assumption that 
the present can be explained only by examining the present (thereby bracketing or ignoring the 
past)‟ (2002, 6) in regard to film texts, they do so more in regard to epistemology. In focusing on 
defending the deductive philosophical suppositions of one epistemology and critiquing another, 
both paradigms apply their theories to historically wide sets of film texts without detailed 
accounts of the relationships between diachronically-specific epistemologies relating to 
diachronically-specific texts. Even if film texts themselves are understood as being informed by 
historical contexts, both paradigms‟ theoretical positions on objectivity, scientific imperialism 
and ideology are understood as applying to the films and audiences they study within a 
chronofetishistic context. Films are understood as being historically contingent, the ideas used to 
comprehend them are not. It may be, then, that Hobson‟s accusation of chronofetishism is 
something more like „epistochronofetishism‟ when applied to contending film theories. Critiques 
are more likely to detail the incompatibility of the rival paradigm‟s underlying assumptions with 
its own than attempt to explain those assumptions as overdetermined reflections of particular 
socio-cultural aggregations, perhaps because such an attack would render the similarly-
contingent assumptions of the critic open to the same attack. 
For Philip Abrams, what historical sociology „is ultimately about is the relation of the 
individual as an agent with purposes, expectations and motives to society as a constraining 
environment of institutions, values and norms – and […] that relationship is one which has its 
real existence not in some abstract world of concepts, theories and jargon but in the immediate 
world of history, of sequences of action and reaction in time‟ (1982, 7-8). Historical sociology 
can thereby demonstrate that it is not only filmmaking that should be thought of in diachronic 
terms, but that academics‟ understandings of films, and the deductive philosophical suppositions 




The study of film epistemologies as historical manifestations of socio-cultural contexts requires a 
more detailed account than is provided by Abrams‟ somewhat linear relationship between „the 
immediate world of history‟ and the „abstract world of concepts, theories and jargon‟ (1982, 7-
8). This is potentially provided by another historical sociological study, relating to the processes 
by which revolutionary ideas and concepts are made manifest in the social world. Immanuel 
Wallerstein understands political revolution within the context of Marx‟s superstructure/base 
relationship. Underlying social, economic and international developments make transformations 
within civil society, that is, within the base. It is only after these developments have already 
happened that political and ideological revolution occurs to legitimate those developments, that 
is, within the superstructure. Thus, for Wallerstein, „the French Revolution was […] the moment 
when the ideological superstructure finally caught up with the economic base. It was the 
consequence of the transition, not its cause nor the moment of its occurrence‟ (1989, 52). 
Abram‟s „abstract world of concepts, theories and jargon‟ is therefore a manifestation of 
transformations within the „immediate world of history, of sequences of action and reaction in 
time‟ (1982, 7-8). 
Since Althusser problematized Marx‟s claim that „[t]he mode of production of material 
life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general‟ (1970, 20-21) by 
arguing that the economic and the political each have their own determinants, which may 
interact, but have their own internal dynamism, so that there is a „relative autonomy of the 
superstructure with respect to the base‟ (Althusser 1971, 130), the rigidity of Wallerstein‟s 
base/superstructure model may be questionable. But with an Althusserian revision, so that the 
relationship between socio-cultural, economic and political backgrounds is understood as 
relatively autonomous to the superstructural ideologies with which they intersect, Wallerstein‟s 
model can demonstrate that intellectual ideas are influenced by developing socio-cultural 
phenomena. Within the Althusserian milieu, these relationships are necessarily hugely complex, 
and clearly can exist simultaneously, since post-structuralism and cognitivism overlap 
historically. However, certain socio-cultural contexts are more conducive to the efficacy of 
certain paradigms, as I will now briefly explore. 
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Given post-structuralism‟s close alignment to Marx‟s claim that „philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it‟ (1975, 423) it is little surprise 
that the paradigm constantly, perhaps fetishistically, recounts Paris „68 as its founding moment. 
Bordwell‟s critique of post-structuralism has also constructed a convincing argument linking the 
historical failures of feminism and neo-Marxism with post-structuralism‟s inherent biases, 
claiming that in the 1970s „[f]eminists were encouraged to adopt the sexists Freud and Lacan 
strategically, as analysts of patriarchy. This theory, articulated in the wake of lost battles of the 
1960s, was more diagnostic than prescriptive. It arose at a period when explaining why 
revolutions fail had a higher priority than showing how successful rebellion might occur‟ (1996, 
11). Such an analysis might seem to offer the kind of historically informed account of the 
relatively autonomous relationships between socio-cultural base and epistemological 
superstructure that I am advocating here, but it is more the exception that proves the rule, 
however. Bordwell‟s statement is part of an argument that film theory‟s specific development 
occurred because of sporadic translations of French texts into English, that is to say, through 
interactions within the superstructure rather than within the base. Indeed, his claim about the 
feminist appropriation of psychoanalysis is used as the opening salvo of an argument concerning 
the reasons why post-structuralism began to convert to what he calls “culturalism” in the 1980s. 
The reasons given are all epistochronofetistic; a-priori philosophical critiques of post-
structuralism (8-9), more French translations (10-11), a heuristic exhaustion with post-
structuralism‟s pessimism (11-12) and its repetition (12). There is no suggestion that Abrams‟ 
„immediate world of history, of sequences of action and reaction in time‟ relates to post-
structuralism‟s „abstract world of concepts, theories and jargon‟ (7-8). 
 
Post-theory and the End of History 
Althusser‟s complex understanding of the relative autonomy of superstructure and base suggests 
the importance of an analysis of both the superstructural influences on epistemological 
development (that is the kind of argument laid out by Bordwell, or the specific philosophical 
defences of paradigm suppositions I discussed earlier) and of the influences from the base (from 
„the immediate world of history, of sequences of action and reaction in time‟ (Abrams 7-8)). If 
this has already been done, to an extent, in terms of post-structuralism‟s avowed origins in the 
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overdetermined world of political praxis, then cognitivism should be put to the same test. The 
absence of cognitivist accounts linking the paradigm with socio-cultural contexts is perhaps 
symptomatic of its disavowal of the impact of the academic subject on that which (s)he studies, 
which Žižek characterised as an „apparently modest position [which] involves a much more 
immoderate position of enunciation of the Post-Theorist himself/herself as the observer 
exempted from the object of his/her study‟ (2001, 16). This disavowal turns, once again, on the 
fundamental issue which, for cognitivism, invalidates both the methodological and the 
intentional premises of post-structuralism; ideology. For, if post-structuralism locates itself in the 
heady ideological context of Paris „68 and its aftermath, cognitivism‟s disavowal of its own 
enunciative position prevents it from situating itself within any socio-cultural, economic or 
political framework. Because of its ostensible objectivity, just as cognitivism sees itself as non-
ideological, so too it sees itself as being non-historical. The cognitivist‟s „immoderate position of 
enunciation‟ extends beyond being an „observer exempted from the object of his/her study‟ 
(Žižek 2001, 16) to being an observer exempted from any form of historical determination. 
Moreover, the enunciative disavowal which prevents this contextualisation is purposive. In 
arguing that „[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a 
perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and 
political time and space‟ (1996, 87, original emphasis) Cox claims that„[t]here is, accordingly, no 
such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so 
represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed 
perspective‟ (87). Cognitivism‟s „concealed perspective‟ has been laid bare in terms of its 
ostensible objectivity and its mischaracterisation of post-structuralism, as this essay has already 
demonstrated. Such arguments address cognitivism as „theory in itself‟ but not as „theory in 
itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space’ (87, my emphasis). And, given the logical 
impenetrability of rival a-priori premises, the critique of cognitivism as „theory in itself‟ without 
the context of its „standpoint in time and space‟ is itself only logical to post-structuralism, an 
example of Mullarkey‟s „adversaries using language rules from one “phrase regimen” and 
applying them to another‟ (2009, 60). Cognitivism in fact will only countenance critique from 
post-structuralism if it adopts a dehistoricised approach that addresses its own internal logic. 




Being sceptical about weak theories isn‟t a return to innocence. It‟s an advance; it 
can cast out error. The task is not to call us naïve but rather that to show that the 
unconscious, the overdetermination of so on and so forth remain valid ideas. The 
way to show this is not by waxing nostalgic for the days when everyone read 
Althusser, but by overcoming our criticisms. (Bordwell 2005) 
 
Therefore, if it is important to find an anti-ideological historical context to which cognitivism 
might have a relatively autonomous relationship, and to which cognitivism might be something 
like „the moment when the ideological superstructure finally caught up with the economic base. 
It was the consequence of the transition, not its cause nor the moment of its occurrence‟ 
(Wallerstein 1989, 52), then the era in which Post-Theory seemed to win some kind of de-
historicised victory over its rival perhaps offers one such context. One need not even seek for 
that socio-cultural context without a superstructural guide from within a related ostensibly 
objective and non-ideological academic account. Francis Fukuyama‟s infamous The End of 
History and the Last Man (1992) is a celebration of the democratic West‟s victory over 
communism, and is described by Jacques Derrida as the „finest ideological showcase of 
victorious capitalism in a liberal democracy which has finally arrived at the plenitude of its ideal‟ 
(1994, 56). It is understood by the editors of Derrida‟s defence of Marx after the Cold War as 
part of „the orgy of self-congratulation which followed the 1989 crumbling of the Berlin Wall 
[and] the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union‟ whose „contagious optimism was best 
exemplified by the confidence and popularity of Francis Fukuyama‟s claim that […] the future 
was to become the global triumph of free market economics‟ (1994, vii). 
Fukuyama borrows from Hegel an eschatology which „did not mean that the natural cycle 
of birth, life, and death would end, that important events would no longer happen. […] It meant, 
rather, that there would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and 
institutions, because all of the really big questions had been settled‟ (1992, xii). Fukuyama‟s 
bundling of „principles and institutions‟ here is somewhat vaguer than that elaborated by 
Wallerstein or Althusser, perhaps not unsurprisingly, given his rejection of Marx. But his 
contention does demonstrate that democracy‟s triumph in its ideological conflict with 
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communism is understood as a matter for both the base and the superstructure. And his account 
of democracy‟s triumph is indicative of the way in which he thinks of ideas acting as Abrams‟ 
„abstract world of concepts‟ (7-8): „What is emerging victorious […] is not so much liberal 
practice, as the liberal idea. That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no 
ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy‟ 
(Fukuyama 1992, 45, original emphasis). Although they share a common etymology, and 
Fukuyama is happy to use the terms in connected sentences, he makes a sharp distinction here 
between ideology, which might challenge liberal democracy, and the liberal idea, which he puts 
in italics, but distinguishes from ideology. 
Like the cognitivist, Fukuyama „posit[s] knowledge as the key to the directionality of 
history – in particular, knowledge about the natural universe that we can obtain through science‟ 
(1992, 72). As such, like the cognitivist, he makes a truth claim based upon ostensibly objective 
scientific imperialism. His own enunciative act is disavowed, so that, like the cognitivist, he 
adopts what Žižek calls an „apparently modest position [that] involves a much more immoderate 
position of enunciation of the Post-Theorist himself/herself as the observer exempted from the 
object of his/her study‟ (2001, 16). 
The specific parallel, however, in Fukuyama‟s and cognitivism‟s epistemologies, is not 
the principle point. Although Fukuyama denies his own epistemology‟s status as ideology he 
does specifically locate his argument within a particular socio-cultural context. His discipline 
relates directly to these contexts in a way in which film studies does not. Indeed, this is where his 
work is a useful example for the historical sociological analysis of cognitivism. His related form 
of scientific imperialism demonstrates clear links between socio-cultural contexts and the 
victorious ideas, to use Fukuyama‟s italics, that emerge from them. Cognitivism‟s almost 
identical and almost identically coterminous non-ideological truth claims can be understood as a 
similar manifestation of „the orgy of self-congratulation which followed the 1989 crumbling of 
the Berlin Wall [and] the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union‟ (Derrida 1994, vii). And, 
since cognitivism‟s origins began before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and its victories over post-
structuralism came after that fall, the relationship between the end of the Cold War and the rise 
of cognitivism is akin to Wallerstein‟s understanding of the temporal lags relating to the French 
Revolution. Thus, cognitivism is „the moment when the ideological superstructure finally caught 
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up with the economic base. It was the consequence of the transition, not its cause nor the 
moment of its occurrence‟ (1989, 52). 
Cognitivism is potentially more ideological than Fukuyama‟s thesis, however. Since 
Fukuyama‟s subject matter is inter-state relations he has no choice but to address the 
relationships between Abrams‟ „immediate world of history‟ and the „abstract world of concepts, 
theories and jargon‟ (1982, 7-8). Cognitivism, on the other hand, can deny all relations to the 
overdetermining hand of the material world, and debate with its rival on its chosen, 
superstructural, ground, upon which it has constructed its own irrefutable internal logic. In 
relation to Cox‟s claim that„[t]here is […] no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a 
standpoint in time and space‟ (1996, 87), Fukuyama‟s work attempts to transcend „theory in 
itself‟ by grounding its argument in „a standpoint in time and space‟ (Cox 1996, 87). The 
contestation of ideas/ideology can be ended by democratic victories in the empirical world. 
Cognitivism, however, attempts to disavow both elements of Cox‟s claim. It sees itself as above 
and beyond theory, and as existing outside time and space. In so doing it demonstrates its 
ideological purpose, or as Cox puts it, „[w]hen any theory so represents itself, it is the more 
important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective‟ (1996, 87). This 
historical context further distances cognitivism from its ostensible objective position. Its 




It is worth noting, in conclusion, that this bundling of cognitivism and Fukuyama‟s End of 
History with victory in the Cold War suggests not only historical determinants but also historical 
culminations. History did not end in the 1990s, nor did the development of ideas/ideology 
relating to History‟s Continuation. One might think of the terrorist attacks on New York in 2001 
in similar terms to Paris ‟68 and Berlin ‟89, invalidating Fukuyama‟s claim that „there is now no 
ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy‟ 
(1992, 45). Similarly, Fukuyama‟s proclaimed „global triumph of free market economics‟ 
(Derrida 1994, vii) delivering „victorious capitalism in a liberal democracy which has finally 
arrived at the plenitude of its ideal‟ (56) might be challenged by a reminder, via the Global 
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Financial Crisis of 2007-8, that Marx‟s oscillating economic base has the potential to produce 
ideas/ideology that critique hegemony as well as legitimate hegemony. 
Accordingly, Fukuyama‟s and cognitivism‟s ostensible objective optimism seems more 
historically contingent than ever. Paraphrasing Trotsky, the cognitivist may not be interested in 
history/dialectic/ideology
4
, but history/dialectic/ideology is interested in the cognitivist. The 
Continuation of History demonstrates that Abrams‟ diachronic relationship between „the 
immediate world of history‟ and the „abstract world of concepts, theories and jargon‟ (1982, 7-8) 
goes on. And, if the relationship of the latter to the former is massively overdetermined and 
somewhat delayed, so that, as Wallerstein claims, the shift in intellectual activity is „the moment 
when the ideological superstructure finally caught up with the economic base. It was the 
consequence of the transition, not its cause nor the moment of its occurrence‟ (1989, 52), then 
perhaps one should expect another shift to reflect history‟s recent challenges to Fukuyama‟s 
optimism. Given the resurgence of competitive ideology and of economic crisis, perhaps one 
should expect a resurgence of post-structuralism, or at least some form of theorising that accepts 
ideology, and the academic‟s inherent enunciative position within discourse, as integral parts of 
any meaning-making. At the least the Continuation of History demonstrates that claims to 
empirical observation of human activity are the product of a specific socio-cultural context that 
may already have passed, or that has at least come under serious question, in both „the immediate 
world of history‟ and the „abstract world of concepts, theories and jargon‟ (Abrams 1982, 7-8). 
Michel Foucault has argued that „[e]ach society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of 
truth: that is the types of discourse that it accepts and makes function as true‟ (1980, 131). If such 
“general politics” are currently undecided, given the incommensurability of competing 
epistemologies, then film studies has a responsibility to analyse the relationships between these 
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1
 Colin MacCabe wrote the preface to Žižek‟s The Fright of Real Tears (2001). 
2
 Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies (Bordwell and Carroll 1996). 
3
 It is perhaps significant that philosophical studies which claim to exist outside the historic boundaries of 
film theory, such as Jean-Francois Lyotard‟s postmodernism (1990, 26), or Gilles Deleuze‟s distinction 
between the movement-image and the time-image (1989, 1992), maintain something akin to post-
structuralism‟s binary distinction between realist film and the avant-garde. 
4
 However you wish to translate this quasi-apocryphal statement. 
